implement new technologies. The locus of decision-making is in the hands of firms as opposed to the government. Both the strategists and the economists are critical of aspects of the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts that require changes in production technology based on government established best available technology (BAT) standards. These regulations fail to give firms sufficient decision-making flexibility.
This article shows that spending on different types of regulations affects productivity differently.
Electric utilities are the setting for this study because they are major polluters whose activities are heavily controlled. Productivity is a critical indicator of competitive advantage (Banker, Chang and Majumdar, 1996; Hall and Winsten, 1959; Majumdar, 1998) and is the paper's focus. To establish new directions for research and theory, we evaluate the relationship between utilities' expenditures on different categories of regulation and their productivity.
VIEWS ON ENVIRONMENTAL SPENDING

A Negative Impact
Spending on environmental regulations has a negative effect (Jaffe, Peterson, Portney and Stavins, 1995) because firms, changing their operations in response to environmental regulations, introduce less efficient processes. High quality environmental inputs are in short supply and drawn from the same pool as inputs used for more productive ends. Using these in environmental projects results in withdrawal from more rewarding efforts (Gray, 1987) . The evidence on whether mandated pollution control investments crowd out investments in more productive plant, however, is mixed (Rose, 1983) . Other arguments are that because pollution control regulations conform to engineering rather than business standards (Wells, 1984) , they induce unnecessary capital investments and prevent good siting decisions. Many environmental regulations also exempt older plant and equipment, penalizing newer-generation equipment and discouraging investments that could reap efficiency gains. Lengthy permit-acquiring processes add to the inefficiency (Barbera and McConnell, 1990 ).
The Alternative View
The idea that expenditures on environmental regulations positively affect firm efficiency is revisionist (Jaffe, Peterson, Portney and Stavins, 1995) . This argument is that pollution, like quality defects, reveals inefficient use of inputs and flaws in product design and production. Regulatory induced spending helps improve production and root out these inefficiencies (King, 1994) . The investments lower the costs of raw materials and their handling and conversion. They increase the value of products by raising their quality and requiring that end users spend less on disposal costs. The efforts undertaken to minimize pollution spawn changes throughout the firm (Porter, 1991; Porter and van der Linde, 1995a; 1995b) . Firms in jurisdictions with more ambitious goals, therefore, are likely to innovate more than firms in jurisdictions with less ambitious goals (Porter and van der Linde, 1995b) . In a world where these goals are constantly rising, firms in the more progressive jurisdictions should be able to achieve first mover advantage.
The Advantages of Flexible Regulation
If regulations allow ample implementation time and impose challenging performance goals, they can create pressures for efficiency (Porter and van der Linde, 1995a; Greenstein, McMaster and Spiller, 1995; Majumdar, 1997) . Without adequate time, however, it is difficult to develop new means and phase in new technologies, and without challenging goals, competitive advantage benchmarks do not exist.
Economists and strategists, therefore, agree that while spending on less flexible regulation retards productivity, spending on more flexible regulation enhances it. The more that choices are exercised within a situation of constraints, the better that the results are likely to be (Marcus, 1988) . If implementers have the flexibility to customize external demands, then productivity is likely to go up. Implementation of rules and regulations will be with the spirit and not just with the letter of the law.
More flexible approaches to regulation have many advantages. (Bourgeios and Brodwin, 1984) .
A body of research (Beyer and Trice, 1978; Marcus, 1988; Strebel, 1987) shows that allowing firms flexibility enhances performance --entrepreneurship and risk-taking are stimulated, while excessive procedures and rule-centered culture stifles innovation (Eisenhardt, 1989) . More flexible approaches allow implementers to move beyond compliance to identification and internalization (Kelman, 1961) .
When those who implement requirements play an active role in their design the results are better.
Implementers given greater flexibility have greater knowledge of contradictory demands and conflicting imperatives at the delivery point (Thomas, 1979) . Imposed decisions increase resistance and delay and reduce the quality of decisions (Guth and MacMillan, 1986) . They also negatively affect the dispositions of implementers (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975) , who then engage in routine and mechanical operationalization (Fidler and Johnson, 1984) .
The Setting for This Study
The setting for this study is the electric utility industry. It has a large impact on the environment. The Environmental Protection Agency (1993) estimates that this industry generates 70 percent of all U.S.
sulfur dioxide emissions and 30 percent of all U.S. nitrogen oxides. It contributes to greenhouse gases by releasing more than 500 million tons of carbon per year (EPA, 1993) . We discriminate among different kinds of regulation separating out the effects of less flexible regulations from the effects of more flexible regulations. We propose that when regulations are flexible, utilities' investments in pollution control systems will be productivity enhancing. When investments are made based on regulations that severely restrict their choices, we expect a negative impact on productivity.
We divide the electric utilities' environmental expenditures into two categories -flexible and inflexible -to capture these different levels of regulatory control (Percival, Miller, Schroeder, and Leape, 1992) . Air and water pollution controls are examples of inflexible regulation. In their case, Congress has pursued a deliberate technology forcing strategy (Percival, Miller, Schroeder, and Leape, 1992) . Emitters have been forced to conform to such standards or else face closure. In the case of air pollution, they have been subject to stringent best available control technology (BACT) and lowest achievable emission rate (LAER) standards. The standards are technically determined by the Environmental Protection Agency, with economics not being allowed to enter into the calculation. In the case of water pollution control, the same type of technology forcing strategy is in effect. Emitters have had to comply with what is technologically feasible. The expectation is that they will rely on Best Available Technology (BAT) endof-pipe (EOP) treatment. BAT is defined by Environmental Protection Agency as the "very best control measures that have been or are capable of being achieved" (Percival, Miller, Schroeder, and Leape, 1992) . The Environmental Protection Agency determines a BAT standard for each industry. Then, under the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), it establishes specific levels of performance for every discharge. The Environmental Protection Agency thereafter provides strict mechanisms to assure compliance.
The air and water pollution control programs are governed by strict timetables. When the EPA was created, Congress looked for "handles" that would guarantee that polluters comply with the law (Marcus, 1980) . It addressed the problem of vague delegation of authority in prior laws with statutes that had specific implementation dates. Instead of Congress in effect saying "here is the problem, deal with it," the EPA had explicit authority to demand compliance by a specific date. The amount of choice available to air and water polluters is very limited. The standards the government sets are end-of-pipe requirements.
There is no reason to look for pollution prevention opportunities, because under the requirements the government establishes it would be difficult to obtain a waiver.
Where investments are made in the air and water pollution control plant mandated by the regulatory authorities, regardless of whether these plant items are relevant to a utility's operations, then the likelihood that such plant spending will be negatively related to productive efficiency will be high. In such a case, firms do not have the operational control over plant investments. These plant items can add to costs as opposed to providing for higher quality output or superior operating performance. Thus, we advance the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Uutilities which incur a relatively greater amount of spending on air and water pollution equipment will be relatively more inefficient.
While the air and water rules allow little room for discretion, the solid waste requirements are examples of flexible regulation. They permit autonomy within a system of constraints. These laws are administered at the local level, not at the national level (Percival, Miller, Schroeder, and Leape, 1992) , where the states are not subject to binding timetables that are in any way similar to the timetables that constrain the EPA with respect to air and water pollution control. In effect, the states have been granted the discretion to deal with the problem as they see fit, subject to achieving the challenging pollution prevention goals the federal government has established. The federal government exempts the remains of fossil fuel combustion from nationally enforced hazardous waste requirements. Regulatory responsibility has been assigned to the states subject to guidelines that make source reduction the preferred solution. In the hierarchy of goals that the federal government has set, source reduction comes first followed by recycling and land filling (Marcus, 1993) .
Thus, the utilities, depending on local conditions, have the latitude to pursue programs of varying degrees of economic benefit to themselves. They can reduce pollution at the source by changing fuels (e.g. buying and using different grades of coal or natural gas), or by investing in alternative production processes. Depending on how close they are to local markets and how much demand there is they can recycle the waste. The fly ash that remains from coal combustion can be made into gypsum. The bottom ash can be converted into concrete. The utilities also can build, operate and upgrade their own ash ponds, landfills, and other systems for removing the waste, or they can pay someone else to transport, manage, and dispose of it. Overall, the solid waste requirements are less rigid than the air and the water pollution laws. These requirements set ambitious goals but not fixed timetables. Firms have discretion in deploying waste pollution prevention equipment. They are likely to deploy those pieces of equipment compatible with their overall operations. Utilities are, therefore, unlikely to deploy equipment that will detract from operating performance. Rather, given the flexibility to do so, utilities will invest in equipment that has positive operating performance consequences. Thus, we advance the hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2:Utilities which incur a relatively greater amount of spending on waste pollution equipment will be relatively more efficient.
METHODS
The U.S. electric utility industry consists of 3,241 firms. Of these firms, 267 firms are owned by private investors, 2,011 firms are publicly owned by state and municipal authorities, 10 firms are federal owned, and 953 firms are organized as cooperatives. While these 267 investor-owned utilities account for only 8 percent of the electric utilities in the nation, they account for 79 percent of all revenues from sales of electricity to ultimate consumers.
We concentrate our analysis on the 150 largest of these investor-owned utilities for which complete data sets are available. Our sample has full cross-sectional variation and includes a large percentage of electric power produced and distributed by private utilities in the United States. In the year used for the empirical study, the total revenues of the investor-owned utilities in the U.S.A. were $155 billion, and the total revenues of the largest 150 utilities of which our sample consists were $150 billion.
We intentionally chose to exclude the smaller utilities because of differences in pollution problems, spending patterns, and productivity factors. The source for our data is the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Statistics of Investor Owned Electric Utilities.
We choose 1990 as the year for the analysis, because in that year, after a long period of criticism, Congress amended the Clean Air Act. Up to 1990, the Clean Air Act was a nearly pure case of an inflexible command and control regime. The 1990 Amendments introduced a pollution trading scheme that altered the utilities' incentive to invest in pollution control equipment. The new law combines command and control requirements with elements of choice previously not available. It provides a degree of flexibility that formerly did not exist. Only by carrying out our analysis in the pre-1990 period could we test the claim that less flexible regulation tends to retard productivity, while more flexible regulation tends to enhance it in the utility industry.
Productivity measurement. Productivity is estimated using data envelopment analysis (Banker, Charnes and Cooper, 1984; Majumdar, 1998) . Data envelopment analysis is a technique that converts multiple input and output measures into a single measure of relative performance for each observation. It the ratio of the weighted outputs to weighted inputs for each observation is maximized. This measure captures the efficiency of each case in converting inputs into outputs.
Following past research on investor-owned utilities (Nelson, 1989; Roberts, 1986) , the output we use in the estimation is the total sales and dispositions of energy in mega-watt hours. The inputs are spending on total production, transmission, distribution, and general plant plus the total number of employees and the amount of purchased power. Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) develop, while Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) extend a multiple output-input measure of efficiency.
Model and explanatory variables. We explain variations in firm-level productive efficiencies using regression analysis where environmental spending variables constitute the primary explanatory variables. This approach is consistent with prior work (Majumdar, 2000) . To evaluate the impact of environmental regulatory factors on the productive efficiency of electric utilities, the regression model which is estimated is: The variable AIR POLLUTION is the ratio of each utility's air pollution plant value to total plant value, the variable WATER POLLUTION is the ratio of each utility's water pollution plant value to total plant value, and the variable WASTE POLLUTION is the ratio of waste pollution plant value to total plant value.These variables capture utilities' investment exposure to different types of pollution control requirements. Capturing environmental spending as the values of different categories of plant dedicated to dealing with different types of pollution control activities is consistent with the literature (Barbera and McConnell, 1990; Jaffe, Peterson, Portney and Stavins; Jaffe and Palmer, 1997) . Firms' spending on different types of pollution control activities is a proxy for differences in the flexibility of various regulations. Firms' spending is reflected as investments made in different types of plant and equipment.
These items plant and equipment have specific functions, which have differing effects on firms' productivity.
Control variables for other environmental expenditures are NOISE POLLUTION and ESTHETIC POLLUTION. They capture investment exposure towards the prevention of noise pollution and towards the maintenance of the utilities' external premises. An examination of the legal basis (Percival, Miller, Schroeder, and Leape, 1992) for these expenditures does not result in a clear indication as to whether they are flexible or inflexible. Most arguments about inflexible rules (Jaffe, Peterson, Portney and Stavins, 1995; Porter, 1991; and Porter and van der Linde, 1995a & 1995b) mention the BAT standards in the air and water pollution requirements explicitly as being causes of great concern. Noise or esthetic pollution expenditures are not mentioned as sources of great concern.
A set of variables control for other important facets of electric utilities' activities that affect productivity. The variable SIZE captures utility size using the natural log of total sales or revenues. In the electric utility industry the relevant evidence (Roberts, 1986) suggests that the size and productive efficiency relationship is positive. The variable R&D is the ratio of research and development expenditures to total operational expenditures. It is a key control variable because the R&D productivity linkage is considered important in the productivity literature (Griliches, 1988) . Density effects are important in influencing electric utilities' performance with respect to transmission activities. Where customers are large and concentrated, as is likely with business customers, operating costs are lowered. Low costs are found to exist particularly where distribution to business users is concerned (Salvanes and Tjotta, 1994) . The variable RESIDENTIAL, which is the ratio of residential customers to total customers, controls for such effects.
Nuclear power production accounts for a fifth of electric power produced in the United States.
Nuclear power generation leads to efficiencies relative to fossil-fuel based power generation (Kamerschen and Thompson, 1993) . As important as this controversial finding is, using nuclear as a control allows us to focus on the fossil fuel generating units where air, water, and solid waste pollution are most relevant. The variable NUCLEAR is the ratio of nuclear power production expenses to total operating expenses. This is a good proxy for the proportion of nuclear power generated by each utility.
A distinguishing feature of electric utilities is the extent of boundary spanning across generation and transmission activities. These activities are distinct. Yet, there are possible scale and scope related vertical economies (Kaserman and Mayo, 1993) to be exploited if an utility does engage in both generation and transmission activities. Conversely, an utility may either supply just generate electric power to be supplied to other utilities. The number of such independent power producers is increasing in the United States. On the other hand, some utilities may just buy out all the power that they sell. We control for the impact of vertical economies on utilities' productivity by introducing the variable PROPORTION GENERATED.
This variable is measured as the extent of electric power sold by a utility that is actually generated by that utility.
We also control for secondary regional effects. The United States is known for regional variations in regulatory policies. We control for these effects by incorporating a dummy variable for each of the following areas of the United States: a NORTHEAST region dummy, a SOUTHEAST region dummy, a SOUTHWEST region dummy, a MIDWEST region dummy, a CENTRAL region dummy and an ATLANTIC region dummy. The base case that is omitted is the Western region of the United States. Of course, other than policy variations that occur between regions of the United States, geography and climatic factors that are unique to a region also affect the operating performance of the electric utilities.
The inclusion of a dummy regional control variable helps account for these important factors.
RESULTS
The efficiency scores range from a minimum of 0.32, on a scale of 0 to 1, to a maximum of 1.00.
The mean score for the 150 electric utilities is 0.78; however, the standard deviation of the score is 0.24, with an associated coefficient of variation of 0.29. Additional evidence of that heterogeneity exits is available from a review of the inter-quartile deviation for the efficiency score. This is 0.42. We estimate the model using a heteroscedasticity correction procedure for all the observations (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993) . Table 1 contains details of the descriptive statistics and correlations for the regressors. Table 2 contains the regression results.
INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE
The results show that in the case of air and water pollution expenditures the impact on utilities' productivity is negative. The primary results are in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 . The variables AIR POLLUTION and WATER POLLUTION are significant with the p values of the t ratios being < 0.05 and < 0.001 respectively. In the case of solid waste control activities the impact on productivity is significantly positive, with the p value for the t ratio for WASTE POLLUTION being < 0.001. Of the two negative pollution abatement variables the AIR POLLUTION variable has more of a negative impact on productivity than the WATER POLLUTION variable. As given in column (3), the standardized coefficients of these variables are -0.127 and -0.107 respectively. The impact of these variables, however, is over-shadowed by the magnitude of the impact of WASTE POLLUTION for which the standardized coefficient is 0.187.
In other words, on average the greater the relative value level of pollution plant that is dedicated to waste pollution in electric utilities, the higher is their productive efficiency. The opposite relationship is true when the plant expenditures being evaluated are the relative values of plant that are dedicated to air and water pollution activities.
We include the variables NOISE POLLUTION and ESTHETIC POLLUTION as control variables because of our interest in disaggregating environmental spending into its components. These variables turn out to be negative, and ESTHETIC POLLUTION turns out to be significant with a p value that is < 0.05.
Based on these results, we see that only when actors have choice within a situation of constraints, as with waste pollution expenditures, does regulation have a positive impact on productivity. In all other cases, and in the aggregate, the effects of regulatory expenditures on productivity are negative. Of the control variables, SIZE, R&D and RESIDENTIAL all are significant and of the generally expected sign.
These results are consistent with theory and our prior expectations, which gives us confidence that the overall model and analysis make sense. The relative impacts of SIZE, R&D and RESIDENTIAL on productivity are quite substantial, as the magnitude of the standardized coefficients show. These are 0.130, 0.230 and -0.325 respectively. The variable NUCLEAR is positive and significant. This result is also consistent with our expectations, while the variable PROPORTION GENERATED is negative and significant.
Including the regional dummies in the model does not change either the sign or the significance of any of the environmental spending variables. This suggests that the inclusion of the regional dummy variables, by controlling for other exogenous, reduces the noise element that can be associated with each of the environmental regulation variables. Our model is thus robust to the inclusion of a number of control variables. These control variables account for several other factors that influence the productivity of electric utilities.
An alternative test. The dependent variable which measures the productive efficiency of each electric utility ranges between 0 and 1. Therefore, the distribution is censored. In our regression estimation the dependent variable is expressed in logs because taking the log of a half-normally distributed variable ranging between 0 and 1 makes the resulting distribution log normal. A way to approach the censoring problem is to estimate a Tobit model (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993) . We carry out an alternative test to determine how robust our results are. We calculate the relative inefficiency of each observation as 1 minus the efficiency score. Perfectly efficient sample firms, therefore, have an inefficiency score of 0.
These are the observations at the limit. Thereafter, to what extent the various regulatory expenditures determine the relative inefficiencies of the utilities are estimated using a Tobit model. In the Tobit model that we have used, to avoid biased and inconsistent parameters (King, 1988) , the log-likelihood score replaces adjusted R-squares as evidence of the overall fit of the model. Table 2 provide the Tobit estimates of the determinants of inefficiency. Now, if a coefficient estimate is negative it means that the variable has a positive impact on efficiency. The variables AIR POLLUTION and WATER POLLUTION are both positive, signifying that they have a negative impact on efficiency; in other words, firms which spend more on these items are inefficient relative to the other firms. In the case of solid waste expenditures the impact on inefficiency is significantly negative, with the p value for the t ratio for WASTE POLLUTION being < 0.05. Again, using an alternative method of estimation, spending more on waste pollution makes firms more efficient relative to the other utilities. This alternative test provides us with confidence that the data support the idea that the more choice actors exercise within a situation of constraints, the better the results that are likely to be.
Columns (4) and (5) in
DISCUSSION
Prior studies about the effects of law, rules and regulations (Sitkin and Bies, 1994) show that both positive and negative impacts arise. The positive impacts are the protection of rights, and the ensuring of fairness, equal treatment, and predictability. The negative impacts are the creation of rigidities and the erosion of trust, learning, and cooperation. The proposition that this study examines is that the more actors exercise choice within a situation of constraints, the better the results are likely to be. Regulations that are better designed give actors more choices. Better designed regulations set goals that are ambitious enough to stretch firms beyond their current practices, but they also provide sufficient time to develop and deploy new means for firms to meet goals. The advantages of rules designed in this fashion are that they encourage entrepreneurship, creativity, and risk taking. Such rules lead to internalization and identification.
They permit implementers to play an active role in policy design, and they draw on implementers' advanced understanding of circumstances at the point of delivery. Laws play an important role in framing internal organizational decision processes (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991) . Our findings suggest that too much law is as problematic as too much discretion. An appropriate balance between legal rules and discretion is needed. The aim should be to design laws and rules where the actors can effectively exercise choice within a system of constraints. This perspective is different from the classic assertion by economists that markets are always superior (Weitzman, 1974) .
Limitations.
Our study has a number of limitations. To start with, relying on 1990 data leads to an analysis that is based on what used to be rather than what is. Even though we have good methodological reasons for using these data, the data are eight years old. It is not at all clear if these data are generalizable to what is happening currently, especially in light of the changes in the Clean Air Act that went into effect in 1990. Indeed, Marcus and Geffen (1999) have found that these changes, which were in the direction of greater flexibility, did stimulate positive innovations that led to environmental improvements and economic benefits for the companies involved.
Air pollution regulations today clearly are not as rigid and poorly designed as they used to be.
EPA, in addition, is making the effort through such programs as Project XL (Excellence in Leadership) to demonstrate increased flexibility throughout its programs (Marcus, Geffen, Sexton, and Weisner, 1999) so long as superior environmental and economic results are guaranteed. The solid waste regulations, moreover, are not as uniformly well-designed as our aggregate analysis suggests. In some localities, there is no question but that some rigidities exist. The solid waste laws are not perfect models for the better rules we would like to see introduced.
We also believe that our anomalous findings about spending on noise and esthetic pollution have to be explained. With respect to esthetic pollution, it is not clear when and in what ways the requirements are flexible. They take into account a broad body of law that is not as discrete as the air and water pollution requirements that apply to the electric utilities.
Areas for future research. Other expenditure categories that regulatory enactments induce should be investigated to assess the generalizability of our findings. These categories do not have to come from the environmental area alone. The full gamut of regulation from occupational safety and health to discrimination in employment is a worthy topic for investigation. For example, while our findings about regulatory flexibility are consistent with previous research on the telecommunications sector (Majumdar, 1997) , recent regulatory changes in that sector are likely to significantly impact firms' behavior. The impact of these changes is a topic worth researching. Another issue that we readily acknowledge is that to advance theory and empirical study, more complete models are needed which introduce additional controls. In the case of each regulatory setting, the models have to be appropriate. They might have to be somewhat different.
In general, we believe that there is growing recognition of the need for greater flexibility within a system of constraints, and that there has been some movement in this direction. However, the effort to design better rules has not advanced as rapidly as its proponents had hoped. It often stalls quickly because of continued legal rigidities and the activities of vested interests (Marcus, Geffen, Sexton, and Weisner, 1999) . In the environmental area, the difficulties arise because existing legal statutes were established in a period when end-of-pipe controls were dominant. Opportunities for pollution prevention were insufficiently understood and appreciated. By its very nature, pollution prevention requires a code of flexibility subsumed within a system of constraints. Ambitious goals have to be tempered by granting latitude in how these goals are to be achieved.
The design of such a system is not at all obvious. A fruitful line of future research would center on appropriate regulatory design in different settings. How can the right balance of freedom and control be achieved? Another area of future research toward which our work points is comparison of the neoclassical assumption of perfect knowledge versus the revionist neoclassical assumption of imperfect knowledge (Leibenstein, 1976) . To what extent would better designed rules cause managers to pay attention to costs previously ignored, as King (1994) suggested, and tighten up organizational slack and xinefficiency? Is there a point at which slack will be absorbed into higher productivity when all the "low lying fruit" and easy environmental waste has been eliminated, or can effective regulation by raising the bar periodically stimulate firms to continue to find innovative ways to internalize environmental externalities? In other words, to what extent can regulators establish ambitious enough goals with sufficient discretion to set up environmental innovation as an arena for industry rivals to vie for competitive advantage? This issue comes down to the question of whether productivity is an absolute or relative concept. Is there a point when all the slack has been absorbed, or can well-designed regulations continue to act to internalize externalities until some theoretical point when all externalities have been internalized?
CONCLUSION
Well-designed regulations provide sufficient time for firms to do R&D and develop new technologies. They require that firms comply with strict goals so long as the means for reaching these goals remain in the corporation's control, and they are flexible in terms of means of implementation with no best available technology requirements. The electric utility industry context has provided a useful testing-ground to evaluate the effects of laws on industry productivity since it has different types regulatory constraints and structures. It has enabled us to investigate more carefully when and under what circumstances Porter and van der Linde's (1995b) argument about environmental regulations having a positive effect on productivity applies. When utilities have greater discretion to fashion a regulatory response that is sensitive to different local conditions, these regulations are more likely to result in competitive advantage. When utilities are legally bound to install a particular technology, for example an end-of-pipe add-on device like a scrubber, the utilities are likely to pay a heavy price with no gain in productivity.
We found that spending by utilities on the air and water pollution regulations tended to retard productivity, while their spending on the solid waste requirements tended to enhance it. To a much greater extent than is the case with air and water pollution requirements, the solid waste regulations were designed with flexibility in mind. Companies had more discretion to choose how they would comply. Therefore, the effect of solid waste regulations on productivity was positive, while the effect of the air and water pollution controls on productivity was negative. The difference between these sets of requirements was in the degree of flexibility they allowed.
Given the controversy about the impact of environmental regulation on industrial productivity, these policy differences are extremely interesting. The main condition set by the Porter and van der Linde (1995b) argument about when environmental requirements can contribute to productivity is that there be options available to industry. Without options available, firms cannot figure out how best to minimize wastes and prevent pollution. This paper adds empirical support to the widely quoted thesis of Porter and van der Linde regarding the influence of environmental regulatory design on firm performance. The productivity focus of this paper adds a new dimension to this body of literature. In this paper we have shown that the apparent controversy between economists and Porter and Van der Linde (1995b) begins to dissolve when consideration is given to regulatory design. Some regulations inhibit productivity. Other regulations have the potential to enhance it. The key difference is the extent to which the regulations set challenging goals and grant firms compliance discretion. 
